CO2-intensive power generation and REDD-based emission offsets with a benefit sharing mechanism by Krasovskii, A. et al.
CO2-intensive power generation 
and REDD-based emission offsets 
with a benefit sharing mechanism
Krasovskii, A., Khabarov, N. and Obersteiner, M.
IIASA Interim Report
2015
 
Krasovskii, A., Khabarov, N. and Obersteiner, M. (2015) CO2-intensive power generation and REDD-based emission offsets 
with a benefit sharing mechanism. IIASA Interim Report. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria, IR-15-018 Copyright © 2015 by the 
author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/11671/
Interim Reports on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
International Institute for Tel: 43 2236 807 342
Applied Systems Analysis Fax: 43 2236 71313
Schlossplatz 1 E-mail: publications@iiasa.ac.at
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria Web: www.iiasa.ac.at
Interim Report IR-15-018
CO2-intensive power generation and REDD-based emission
offsets with a benefit sharing mechanism
Andrey Krasovskii (krasov@iiasa.ac.at)
Nikolay Khabarov (khabarov@iiasa.ac.at)
Michael Obersteiner (oberstei@iiasa.ac.at)
Approved by
Pavel Kabat
Director/CEO, IIASA
November 20, 2015
Interim Reports on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited
review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National
Member Organizations, or other organizations supporting the work.
ZVR: 524808900
– ii –
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Modeling framework 2
2.1 Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Assumptions for modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 Modeling REDD-based offsets under uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3.1 Decision-making with REDD offsets, benefit sharing mechanism,
and known realization of CO2 price in the second time period. . . . 7
3 Analytical results 8
4 Modeling results 9
4.1 Data and calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2 Numerical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3 The role of the benefit sharing mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5 Conclusions 12
References 15
A Appendix 16
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.4 Proof of Theorem 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
– iii –
Abstract
We propose and explore financial instruments supporting programs for reducing emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation (FI-REDD). Within a microeconomic framework
we model interactions between an electricity producer (EP), electricity consumer (EC), and
forest owner (FO). To keep their profit at a maximum, the EP responds to increasing CO2
prices by adjusting electricity quantities generated by different technologies and charging a
higher electricity price to the EC. The EP can hedge against future high (uncertain) CO2
prices by employing FI-REDD: they can purchase an amount of offsets under an unknown
future CO2 price and later, when the CO2 price is discovered, decide how many of these
offsets to use for actually offsetting emissions and sell the rest on the market, sharing the
revenue with the FO. FI-REDD allows for optional consumption of emission offsets by the
EP (any amount up to the initially contracted volume is allowed), and includes a benefit
sharing mechanism between the EP and FO as it regards unused offsets.
The modeling results indicate that FI-REDD might help avoid bankruptcy of CO2-
intensive producers at high levels of CO2 prices and therefore serve as a stabilizing mech-
anism during the transition of energy systems to greener technologies. The analytical
results demonstrate the limits for potential market size explained by existing uncertain-
ties. We illustrated that when suppliers and consumers of REDD offsets have asymmetric
information on future CO2 prices, benefit sharing increases the contracted REDD offsets
quantity.
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1 Introduction
This paper is devoted to the elaboration of financial instruments supporting the Reduced
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) mechanisms [1, 2, 3]. In the
papers [4, 5] decision-making of the price-taking electricity producers consists of choosing
between investing in research and development (R&D) to implement new technologies
(carbon capture and storage (CCS) modules) and buying REDD options. Our approach
differs in several ways. Firstly, we consider the case when the energy producer has market
power – the ability to reduce the production output and charge higher electricity prices to
consumers. Thus, in the face of uncertain CO2 prices the electricity producer with market
power has more flexibility compared to the price-taking energy producer. Secondly, the
electricity producer in our model is a medium-term decision maker: he doesn’t change his
technology portfolio by decommissioning CO2-intensive plants and building new power
plants (which would be a long-term investment). The optimization model works with
two time steps: initial (low) CO2 price and future (uncertain) CO2 price. This simplified
rather conceptual modeling approach is justified, because a dynamic model would require
additional information about the future which is not available at the moment: CO2 price
formation process, REDD offsets acceptance on the market, etc. For the same reason we
focus on the direct contracting of REDD offsets between the forest owner and electricity
producer, and do not consider market modeling. We constructed a microeconomic model of
interaction between the forest owner (REDD-supplier), electricity producer, and electricity
consumer. In the proposed partial equilibrium modeling framework the CO2 prices are
exogenous. The decision-making process of the electricity producer (under condition of
existing or absent CO2 tax/price) consists of (see, e.g., [6, 7]): (i) choosing power plant
load factors to minimize the cost given the hourly electricity demand profile and installed
capacities of particular power generation technologies; and (ii) choosing an electricity price
to maximize the profit based on the demand function indicating consumers sensitivity to
electricity prices.
The electricity producer in the model has market power meaning that he can set the
price for electricity above his marginal cost according to a demand function. Recent
studies suggest that energy companies possess a certain degree of market power [6, 8, 9].
We apply a constant elasticity demand function [10] in the model. The elevating CO2
price might impact not only the profits of the electricity producer (decrease), but also
*Ecosystems Services & Management Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
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the electricity prices for the consumer (increase), and, hence, some financial instruments
might be implemented today in order to be prepared for uncertain CO2 prices in the future
[3]. We propose and explore financial instruments supporting REDD program. On the
supply side of the REDD-based emission offsets we model a forest owner who decided to
preserve the forest and sell respectively generated REDD-based emission offsets (further
– REDD offsets). The focus of our analysis is how the forest owner and the electricity
producer evaluate their fair prices for different amounts of REDD offsets. In the paper, the
fairness of the price is understood in the sense of parties’ indifference of whether to engage
in contracting a given amount of REDD offsets or not. The fair price of the electricity
producer (forest owner) means that for higher (lower) prices the electricity producer (forest
owner) will not want to engage in the contract. In case when parties can agree on the
fair price, the problem is then to find the maximum amount of REDD offsets which can
be contracted. A similar approach in a different problem setup is considered in the paper
[11], where the authors developed a newsvendor model to determine the optimal price and
volume of CCS contracts to maximize the expected profit of a storage operator.
The idea of benefit sharing is important within the REDD context [12]. We propose a
benefit-sharing mechanism that is activated in the case when the electricity producer emits
less than the amount of REDD offsets contracted in the first period (without CO2 price);
in this case the unused amount of REDD offsets is shared with the forest owner. We show
that for this benefit sharing mechanism there is an equilibrium amount of REDD offsets
up to which the fair prices coincide, meaning that the deal takes place. We prove that
for larger amounts of REDD offsets the desired price of the electricity producer (buyer) is
lower than the price of the forest owner (seller), meaning that for these larger amounts the
deal is not possible. The paper considers mathematical constructions and properties of the
proposed financial instrument. Analytical results presented in the paper are illustrated
by a numerical case study based on realistic data for regional electricity production. The
modeling results indicate that financial instruments supporting REDD might help avoid
bankruptcy of CO2-intensive producers at high price levels of CO2 and, therefore, serve as
a stabilizing mechanism during the transition of energy systems to greener technologies.
2 Modeling framework
In this section, firstly, we present a model of an electricity producer with market power
operating without contracting REDD offsets. The decision making of the electricity pro-
ducer consists in choosing a technological mix in order to meet the hourly demand and
to maximize profit. The optimal response in terms of the emissions reduction and raising
electricity price is constructed for any CO2 price. Secondly, we introduce a two-period
model for REDD offsets contracting. Given the distribution of uncertain CO2 prices in
the second period, the electricity producer solves in the first period the problem of ex-
pected profit maximization for various amounts of contracted REDD offsets. Based on the
comparison of expected profits with and without contracting REDD offsets the electricity
producer evaluates his fair (indifference) price for each amount of offsets. Similarly, the
forest owner – the seller of REDD offsets – calculates his fair price. We introduce the
benefit sharing mechanism and solve the optimization problem of the electricity producer,
who has two options: either (i) to emit more than available REDD offsets, or (ii) to emit
less and share the benefit with the forest owner.
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2.1 Notations
In our model the electricity producer uses n technologies that vary in costs (US$/MWh,
excluding emission costs) and emission factors (ton of CO2/MWh). Let us introduce the
following notations:
ai, i = 1, .., n are installed capacities (MW);
vi are variable costs (US$/MWh);
dj , j = 1, .., 24 is hourly average demand (MW);
x = {xij}, i =, 1.., n, j = 1, .., 24, is a matrix of hourly load factors (controls, ratio
between 0 and 1);
q(x) = (q1, ., q24) = {
∑n
i=1 aixij} is a vector of hourly outputs (MWh);
Q = Q(x) =
∑n
i=1 ai
∑
24
j=1 xij is aggregate daily production (MWh);
P e is electricity price (US$/MWh);
D−1 : P e = D−1(Q) is inverse demand function (see Section 4.1);
εi are emission factors (ton of CO2/MWh);
p is CO2 price (US$/ton of CO2).
For each matrix of load factors x the profit of the electricity producer in the absence
of CO2 price is calculated as follows:
Πe(x) = R(x)− C(x), (1)
where
R(x) = P e
(
Q(x)
)
Q(x), (2)
is the revenue, and
C(x) =
N∑
i=1
viai
24∑
j=1
xij + Fc, (3)
is the cost function. A constant fixed cost component, Fc, is not included in the optimiza-
tion problem, and is used only for profit calculation.
For each CO2 price p a production scenario x generates corresponding emissions:
E(x) =
n∑
i=1
εiai
24∑
j=1
xij , (4)
and the total profit of the electricity producer is calculated as follows:
Π(x, p) = Πe(x)− E(x)p. (5)
We will assume that the CO2 price belongs to a segment p ∈ [0, p˜]. Let us note that
the profit component Πe and emissions E does not directly depend on price p, however,
they are indirectly determined by the technological possibilities of the electricity producer.
We assume that the hourly profile changes proportionally to the aggregate demand
(see [3] and section 4.1 for details) and introduce the feasibility domain X, which contains
all technological mixes (controls) satisfying the hourly demand:
X = {x : xij ∈ [0, 1] and q(x) ≥
Q(x)
Q0
d0}, (6)
where d0 = (d01, .., d
0
24) and Q
0 are, respectively, the initial hourly and daily aggregate
demands (at zero CO2 price).
In our modeling framework we consider the electricity producer as a profit-maximizing
decision maker. The profit maximization problem is formulated as follows.
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Problem 1 (without REDD offsets). Given the feasibility domain X (6), for every CO2
price p the electricity producer maximizes his profit (5):
maximize
x∈X
Π(x, p). (7)
Let us denote a solution to the Problem 1 – the optimal technological mix – by the
symbol x∗
1
= x∗
1
(p) for any price p ∈ [0, p˜]. Then, by definition of x∗
1
for any x ∈ X (6)
the following inequality holds:
Π(x∗
1
, p) ≥ Π(x, p). (8)
Let us denote by the symbol Πˆ(p) the maximum profit at price p:
Πˆ(p) = Π(x∗
1
(p), p) = Πe(x
∗
1
(p))− E(x∗
1
(p))p. (9)
The corresponding electricity price is calculated as P e(Q(x∗
1
(p)).
2.2 Assumptions for modeling
In our study we assume the following properties of optimal profit Πˆ(p) (9) and emissions
Eˆ(p) = E(x∗
1
(p), p) with respect to CO2 price.
Assumption 1. The optimal profit and optimal emissions achieve their maxima at zero
CO2 price, p = 0, and are continuous strictly declining functions with respect to growing
p:
Πˆ(p) ↓, Eˆ(p) ↓, when p ↑ . (10)
This assumption is straightforward in the provided modeling framework [3]. It is also
consistent with results of larger scale modeling [13].
Remark 1. Under assumption 1 for every CO2 price p ∈ [0, p˜] there exists a unique
emissions level Eˆ(p) = E(x∗
1
(p)) corresponding to maximum profit Πˆ(p).
Remark 2. Assumption 1 basically restricts the consideration of electricity producers to
those unfavorably (negatively) affected by an emerging CO2 price. Those who can poten-
tially benefit from it, e.g. due to a competitive advantage, are not considered here. This
situation is beyond the scope of this paper, which is focused on the problem of CO2-intensive
power generation.
Based on the Assumption 1 we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For any x ∈X (6), such that E(x) 6= E(x∗
1
(p)), the following inequality holds
for all p ∈ (0, p˜]:
Πe(x
∗
1
(p))− E(x∗
1
(p))p > Πe(x)− E(x)p. (11)
The proof is given in the Appendix A.1.
Lemma 1 has the following meaning. If we fix CO2 price p and select an arbitrary mix of
technologies x satisfying the hourly demand, such that the corresponding emissions differ
from optimal emissions for the price p, then this mix x is not optimal for the electricity
producer in the sense of profit maximization.
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2.3 Modeling REDD-based offsets under uncertainty
High CO2 price decreases the profit of the electricity producer. This negative effect as
such can be amplified by uncertainty about the future CO2 price levels and lead to an
excessive risk. To hedge against that the emitter can engage in contracting REDD offsets
before the information about CO2 price is revealed, contracted REDD offsets would allow
offsetting CO2 emissions in the future. A forest owner is supplying REDD offsets. Let
us note that we are not taking into account additional factors in the payoff of the forest
owner, e.g. the opportunity of deforesting and selling the wood. We assume that the forest
owner decided to keep the forest for generating REDD offsets.
Let the future CO2 price be an uncertain variable [14] following a discrete probability
distribution:
{pl, wl}, l = 1, ..,m,
m∑
l=1
wl = 1, pl ∈ [0, p˜], wl ∈ (0, 1], (12)
where wl stands for probability, and realizations of possible prices pi 6= pj , if i 6= j.
A problem is divided into two stages: at the first stage forest owner and electricity
producer negotiate an amount E ∈ (0, E0] of REDD offsets and their price. Here E0 is the
maximum amount of emissions – generated by the electricity producer at zero CO2 price,
i.e. E0 = Eˆ(0).
At the second stage they face a realization of uncertain CO2 price. At each realization
of the CO2 price the electricity producer can either use all REDD offsets (by emitting
more or equal to the previously contracted amount E), or emit less than E and share the
benefit with the forest owner from selling the rest (unused offsets) in the market (at a
market price p).
Benefit sharing mechanism. The electricity producer and forest owner, when selling
offsets on the market, get shares of the market price δ and (1− δ) respectively, so that:
• If δ = 1, the electricity producer has the right to sell the offsets in the second period
at a market price without sharing the profit with forest owner.
• If δ = 0, the electricity producer can only use the contracted REDD credits to offset
the factual amount of his emissions and the unused credits are returned (without
compensation) back to the forest owner, i.e. no resale by the electricity producer
is possible on the market. The profit from unused offsets goes entirely to the forest
owner.
• If 0 < δ < 1, the electricity producer faces a trade-off between emitting more and,
hence, using more of the contracted REDD credits for offsetting their emissions
versus sharing the profit with the forest owner from selling the offsets at the market
price.
The benefit sharing ratio δ is included in the negotiation process between REDD-
offsets supplied (forest owner) and consumer (electricity producer) along with the amount
of offsets E and their price.
We assume that the forest owner and electricity producer face the same CO2 price
distribution. The presence of REDD offsets at the second stage of the model leads to the
following modification in the decision-making problem of the electricity producer compared
to the case without REDD (see Problem 1).
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Problem 2 (with REDD offsets). Given the feasibility domain X (6), CO2 price dis-
tribution {pl, wl} (12) and amount of REDD offsets E ∈ (0, E
0] contracted in the first
time period the electricity producer solves in the second time period the following profit-
maximization problem for every possible future CO2 price pl:
maximize
x∈X
ΠR(x, pl), (13)
where
ΠR(x, pl) = Πe(x)− pl
[
E(x)− E
]
+
+ δpl
[
E − E(x)
]
+
. (14)
Here [y]+ = max{y, 0}, meaning that the electricity producer can offset his emissions
up to the amount E by using REDD offsets, the rest is sold on the market and the profit
is shared with the forest owner.
The optimal technological mix x∗
2
(pl) – solution to (13) – generates the maximum
profit with REDD: ΠˆR(pl) = Π
R(x∗
2
(pl), pl) at a particular CO2 price pl. We denoted
by the symbol ER(pl) =
[
E − E(x∗
2
(pl))
]
+
the corresponding amount of emission offsets
returned to the forest owner.
In our model we assume that the electricity producer and forest owner are both risk
neutral and, therefore, we deal with expected values:
EΠˆR(E , δ) =
m∑
l=1
ΠˆR(pl)wl, (15)
EΠˆ =
m∑
l=1
Πˆ(pl)wl, p¯ = Ep =
m∑
l=1
plwl.
where Πˆ(pl) = Πˆ(x
∗
1
(pl)) (9) is solution to the Problem 1 (without REDD) for p = pl, and
p¯ is the mean CO2 price.
The discussion below is devoted to the valuation of various amounts of REDD offsets
contracted in the first time period under unknown CO2 price assuming the given distri-
bution (12) and benefit sharing ratio δ ∈ [0, 1]. The forest owner and electricity producer
evaluate their fair (indifference) prices for the given amount of options. Thus, the forest
owner chooses his fair price pF at which he can sell the amount of offsets E in the first
period using the indifference condition:
(1− δ)
m∑
l=1
plE
R(pl)wl + pFE = p¯E , (16)
meaning that the forest owner can either sell the emission offsets to the electricity
producer in the first period and, possibly, get a profit share in the second period, or keep
the offsets and sell them in the second period at the market CO2 price without engaging
in a deal with the electricity producer.
Similarly, the electricity producer derives the price he is willing to pay for the REDD
offsets according to his indifference condition:
EΠˆR(E , δ)− pEE = EΠˆ. (17)
For the given CO2 price distribution {pl, wl}, l = 1, ..,m (12), benefit sharing ratio
δ ∈ [0, 1] and amount of offsets E ∈ (0, E0] based on the equations (16)-(17) one can derive
the fair prices for the forest owner pF and the electricity producer pE :
pF = pF (E , δ) = p¯− (1− δ)
∑m
l=1 plE
R(pl)wl
E
, (18)
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pE = pE(E , δ) =
EΠˆR(E , δ)− EΠˆ
E
. (19)
For a fixed parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] equations (18)-(19) represent supply and demand curves
for REDD offsets within the suggested benefit sharing approach. Let us note that for δ = 1
(no benefit sharing with REDD supplier) the forest owner and electricity producer agree1
on any amount E , as:
EΠˆR(E , δ = 1) = p¯E + EΠˆ, pF (E , δ = 1) = p¯, (20)
and hence pF = pE = p¯ for any E .
In the next section we discuss what amount they can contract, when the benefit sharing
takes place, i.e. for any δ ∈ [0, 1).
2.3.1 Decision-making with REDD offsets, benefit sharing mechanism, and
known realization of CO2 price in the second time period.
In order to analyze the behavior of the electricity producer let us consider a certain real-
ization of CO2 price p = pl in the second period. Technically, the Problem 2 can be split
into two alternative profit-maximizing tasks.
Problem 3 (E(x) ≥ E). Given the feasibility domain X (6) and the amount of REDD
offsets E ∈ (0, E0], maximize the profit:
maximize
x∈X3
ΠR3 (p,x), (21)
where
ΠR3 (p,x) = Πe(x)− p(E(x)− E), (22)
X3 = X ∩ {x : E(x) ≥ E}. (23)
Let us denote the solution to Problem 3 by the symbol x∗
3
= x∗
3
(p) ∈ X3. The
corresponding maximum profit is given by the relation:
ΠˆR3 = Πˆ
R
3 (p) = Πe(x
∗
3
)− p(E(x∗
3
)− E). (24)
Problem 4 (E(x) ≤ E). Given the feasibility domain X (6) and the amount of REDD
offsets E ∈ (0, E0], maximize the profit:
maximize
x∈X4
ΠR4 (p,x), (25)
where
ΠR4 (p,x) = Πe(x)− δp(E(x)− E), (26)
X4 = X ∩ {x : E(x) ≤ E}. (27)
Let us denote the solution to Problem 4 by the symbol x∗
4
= x∗
4
(p) ∈ X4. The
corresponding maximum profit is given by the relation:
ΠˆR4 = Πˆ
R
4 (p) = Πe(x
∗
4
)− δp(E(x∗
4
)− E). (28)
Thus, for any fixed amount of E ∈ (0, E0] available in the second period the electricity
producer chooses the best response to CO2 price p = pl in terms of profit-maximization –
between ΠˆR3 (24) and Πˆ
R
4 (28):
ΠˆR(p) = max{ΠˆR3 , Πˆ
R
4 }, (29)
1Even though this would imply excessive risk for both parties.
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which is equivalent to (13)-(14). The solution to Problem 2 is chosen according to the
rule:
x∗
2
=
{
x∗
3
, if ΠˆR = ΠˆR3
x∗
4
, if ΠˆR = ΠˆR4
(30)
The described optimization alternatives as possibilities for the electricity producer in
our two-stage model are illustrated in Figure 1.
mp
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)(ˆ 4 lR p
Period 1 Period 2
.   .    .
.   .    .
0
Contracted 
REDD offsets
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Figure 1: Illustration of the problem setting: initially contracted amount of offsets E and
realization of the uncertain CO2 price.
3 Analytical results
In this section we analytically find the maximum profit (29) of the electricity producer
depending on the amount of REDD offsets E ∈ (0, E0] and determine the corresponding
fair prices of the forest owner and electricity producer. This allows us to obtain an estimate
of the amount of REDD offsets that can be contracted.
Lemma 2. For any CO2 price p, any benefit sharing ratio δ ∈ [0, 1], and any fixed amount
E of contracted offsets in the first period such that E ∈ (0, E(x∗
1
(p))] the maximum profit
with REDD (29) is calculated as follows:
ΠˆR(p) = ΠˆR3 = Πe(x
∗
1
(p))− pE(x∗
1
(p)) + pE . (31)
The proof is in the Appendix A.2
Remark 3. The definition of Lemma 2 is that for any realization of future CO2 price p the
optimal emissions and profits in the case of contracting REDD offsets are equal to those
without contracting REDD offsets, provided that the contracted amount does not exceed
the optimal quantity of emissions (without contracting REDD) for that CO2 price p.
Lemma 3. For any CO2 price p ∈ [0, p˜], any benefit sharing δ ∈ [0, 1), and any amount E
of contracted offsets in the first period such that E > E(x∗
1
(p)) the fair price of the forest
owner pF (18) is always higher than the fair price of the electricity producer (19).
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The proof is in the Appendix A.3.
Finally, let us formulate and prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For a given CO2 price distribution {pl, wl}, l = 1, ..,m (12) and for any
benefit sharing ratio δ ∈ [0, 1) there exists an amount E˜ ∈ (0, E0] of REDD offsets up
to which the fair prices of the forest owner pF (18) and of the electricity producer pE
(19) coincide and are equal to the expected CO2 price p¯. This amount equals the minimum
optimal quantity of emissions generated by the electricity producer at the maximum possible
CO2 price p˜ = max{pl}:
pF = pE = p¯ for any E ≤ E˜ , δ ∈ [0, 1], (32)
where
E˜ = E(x∗
1
(p˜)). (33)
For any amount of REDD offsets larger than E˜ (33) the fair price of the forest owner
pF is higher than the fair price of the electricity producer pE:
pF > pE for any E > E˜ , δ ∈ [0, 1). (34)
The proof is in the Appendix A.4
Remark 4. Theorem 1 shows that in the case of a bounded CO2 price distribution of the
CO2 price, the forest owner and electricity producer can contract any amount E ∈ (0, E˜ ]
of REDD offsets for the fair price p¯. Thus, in the considered risk-neutral case, only two
characteristics of distribution fully determine the solution to the problem: the mean and
the highest price.
The practical consequence following from this main result is that – on one hand – the
potentially contracted amount is limited by the potentially high future CO2 price (the higher
the price, the lower is the contracted amount). On the other hand, even with possibility of
a high CO2 price the contracted amount is non-zero, hinting at possibly implementing the
REDD-based offset instrument featuring a benefit sharing approach as considered in this
paper.
4 Modeling results
Analytical results obtained in the previous section are valid for a broad range of possible
model setups in our modeling framework. In order to provide a numerical example and
illustrate the impact of a contracted amount of REDD offsets on the profit distribution of
the electricity producer, we calibrate the model for a realistic case-study, and carry out
numeric optimization.
4.1 Data and calibration
Technologies in the model. In our illustrative case study a regional electricity pro-
ducer is operating power plants with the following technologies: coal (pulverized coal
steam), combustion turbine (natural gas-fired) and combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT)
(see [7]). The corresponding fixed and variable costs, as well as the installed capacities are
given in Table 1. The total size of installed capacity (7900 MW) is chosen to illustrate a
model at a regional scale, and is roughly equivalent to the installed capacity of Belarus2.
2See International Energy Statistics provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=2&pid=2&aid=7
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Table 1: Technological data for the case-study. Sources: [7, 15, 16].
Technology Annual fixed
cost, thou-
sands of
US$/MWy
Variable cost,
US$/MWh
Installed Ca-
pacity, MW
Emission fac-
tors, tons of
CO2/MWh
Coal-fired 224 18.9 3800 1.02
Natural gas-fired
combustion turbine
64 55.6 1900 0.55
Natural gasfired
combined cycle
96 39 2200 0.33
Average hourly electricity demand. To construct an economically efficient produc-
tion plan the electricity producer has to determine the combination of technologies to be
used hourly during the day in order to satisfy the hourly demand profile. A hypothetical
demand profile for an average day of the year is depicted in the Figure 2. It features
the same shape (peaks) as the regional profiles provided in the literature [17, 18]. The
hourly demand values are scaled to match the installed capacity of the electricity producer
(as in Table 1). Similar to [18] we use the hourly average demand for each day over a
longer period, e.g. one year. This simplification allows us to link the hourly profile with
the aggregate demand. We estimate the hourly profile change assuming that a change
in aggregate demand leads to the proportional shifts in every hour of the profile for an
average day. Our model is working with an average demand profile at the annual scale
and provides a higher level of abstraction than the unit commitment (UC) problem (see
e.g. [19]).
Time of day
M
W
0
10
00
20
00
30
00
40
00
50
00
60
00
70
00
1   2    3   4   5    6   7   8   9   10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Figure 2: Average hourly electricity demand.
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Demand function. We assume that the electricity producer has market power in the re-
gion, and use a constant elasticity demand curve, that is commonly employed in aggregate
energy demand studies [20, 10]. The consumers respond to the change in electricity price
P e by changing the consumption Q according to an aggregate demand function D(P e),
i.e.:
P e = D−1(Q) = AQα, (35)
where A > 0 is a constant, and α < 0 is the constant elasticity of demand. The
coefficients of the aggregate demand function in our model are calibrated in such a way that
a realistic electricity price (close to European3 electricity price) is achieved as a solution
to the optimization Problem 1. The estimated parameters of the demand function (35)
are A = 1.05 × 105, α = −0.612. These values are consistent with P e = 90.5US$/MWh
at profits maximum without CO2 price. The value of elasticity coefficient ǫd =
1
α
= −1.63
is within a plausible range as estimated in the literature (for a set of OECD countries it
was found to be within the confidence interval of −2.3, ...,−0.1, see, e.g. [20]). In our
example the profit maximizing quantity is Q0 = 100.47GWh (which is approximately
equal to the average daily electricity consumption in Belarus4), and the corresponding
profit is Πˆ(Q0) = 3.56mln. US$.
Emissions factors. For presently operating, coal-fired power plants the cummulative
emissions range between 950 and 1250 gCO2 eq/ kWh [15]. In our study we use a value
from an indicated interval given in Table 1. Emissions factors for gas powered plants are
taken from [16].
4.2 Numerical results
Simulations were carried out for the discrete (nine points) approximation of a uniform
price distribution within the range 0–80 US$/ton of CO2:
pl = 10(l − 1), wl =
1
9
, l = 1, .., 9. (36)
Sizes of REDD-based offset contracts used in the model are within the range [0, E0],
where E0 is the optimal emissions without CO2 price. In Figure 3 the fair prices (18)-
(19) with respect to the contracted amount of offsets E ≤ E0 are depicted for the benefit
sharing ratio δ = 0.5. The plot demonstrates that the maximum amount of emissions
offsets for which the deal can take place is E˜ = E(x∗(p9)) = 10.93 MtCO2. That amount
the electricity producer emits at the maximum CO2 price p9 = 80 US$/ton CO2, while
maximizing his profit. For amounts larger than E˜ the fair price of the forest owner is
higher than the fair price of the electricity producer. This is consistent with analytical
results of the paper.
In Figure 4 we show how the contacted amount E˜ impacts the profit distribution of
the electricity producer. The plot shows that although the mean profit determined by
the considered CO2 price distribution stays the same with REDD offsets (compared to the
case without them), EΠˆR = EΠˆ (15), entering into REDD offsets contract does impact the
profit distribution. Notably, REDD offsets help the electricity producer to hedge against
higher CO2 prices and almost double their profit in this case.
3See Quarterly Reports On European Electricity Markets http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/statistics/market-analysis
4See the EIA website http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=2&pid=2&aid=2
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Figure 3: Fair prices of the electricity producer (EP) and forest owner (FO) depending
on the volume of REDD offsets. Benefit sharing ratio is δ = 0.5, and future CO2 price
distribution is uniform within the range 0–80 US$/ton CO2.
4.3 The role of the benefit sharing mechanism
In this section we provide a numerical illustration of how the benefit sharing mechanism
determined by the parameter δ can impact the amount of contracted REDD offsets. Even
though the benefit sharing concept is at the core of the suggested construction, it remains
inactive if electricity producer and forest owner use one common CO2 price distribution in
their decision-making. Let us explore a situation when the electricity producer and forest
owner perceive the CO2 price distribution asymmetrically. For instance, they could put
different weights wl in (12) for the same values of CO2 prices pl. For example, the forest
owner may expect the distribution as in (36), while the electricity producer may put more
weight on higher prices, i.e. his distribution can be:
pl = 10(l − 1), wl = 0.01(l + 6.11), l = 1, .., 9. (37)
The difference between (36) and (37) can be interpreted as the electricity producer
is more sensitive to larger profit loses (risk-averse). In the case of price distribution (37)
(risk-averseness) the contracted amount E˜ of the electricity producer is higher as he is
willing to pay a higher fair price compared to the case with the distribution (36). The
Figure 5 demonstrates how the benefit sharing ratio δ impacts the amount of contracted
offsets E˜ : for larger parameter δ, the contracted amount E˜(δ) is larger. In this example
for δ = 0.5 the contracted amount of REDD offsets has increased considerably compared
to no benefit sharing, δ = 0. This preliminary analysis shows that the benefit sharing
mechanism has a potential to increase the volume of REDD contracts.
5 Conclusions
In developing a fair mechanism for REDD it is important to understand the decision-
making process (optimal behavior) of energy producers – the potential buyers of REDD-
based offsets, because of considerable total share of emissions coming from the energy
– 13 –
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Figure 4: Profit of the electricity producer (distribution) without contracting REDD offsets
and with contracting REDD offsets for the optimal volume (E˜ = 10.93 MtCO2) and benefit
sharing ratio δ = 0.5.
sector (see, e.g., [21]). Our model deals with medium-term planning of the electricity
producer who possesses flexibility in his responses to uncertain CO2 prices. The electricity
producer in the model is restricted in exercising market power (charging the electricity
price) by the elasticity of demand coming from electricity consumers and is maximizing
his profit by optimizing technological mixes in the production. The analytical results
provided in the paper are based only on the assumption that with growing CO2 Price,
optimal profit and corresponding emissions are strictly declining functions. The problem of
optimal usage of REDD offsets by the electricity producer is formalized in the two-period
model with an uncertain CO2 price.
The valuation of REDD offsets by the forest owner (seller) and electricity producer
(buyer) based on their fair (indifference) conditions has several important implications.
We show that when there is no profit sharing mechanism and the forest owner can use
and resell all the offsets traded at the first stage, then the agreement can be made for any
amount of REDD offsets at the mean CO2 price. This, however, would imply a high level
of certainty about the future CO2 price, so that the risk for the buyer (possible lower price)
and risk for the seller (possible higher price) are acceptable. Under the condition of highly
uncertain CO2 prices and consequently higher risks, the benefit sharing mechanism allows
to reduce this risk thanks to a greater future flexibility. In the case of benefit sharing
coming from selling the unused offsets on the market and sharing the profit between the
forest owner and electricity producer, we analytically prove two results. Firstly, there exist
amounts of REDD offsets for which the fair prices coincide and are equal to the mean
CO2 price. The maximum contracted amount corresponds to the minimum amount of
emissions generated by the electricity producer – at the maximum expected CO2 price.
Secondly, for larger amounts the fair price of the electricity producer is lower than the fair
price of the forest owner and, therefore, these amounts are not contracted. This fact is not
straightforward in the scenario when the electricity producer can share the profit with the
forest owner, and the analytical proof is given in Lemma 3 (see Case 2 in Appendix A.3).
This means that if the forest owner agrees to sell a “larger” amount of REDD offsets at
– 14 –
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Figure 5: Impacts of benefit sharing on the contracted amounts of REDD-based offsets
under asymmetric information on the CO2 price distribution. Dashed lines are fair prices
of the forest owner (FO) and electricity producer (EP) for benefit sharing ratio δ = 0.5,
solid lines – for δ = 0 (no benefit sharing).
the price suggested by the electricity producer someone will lose compared to a situation
when not making this deal. In our problem setting two characteristics of the expected CO2
price distribution are important for contracting REDD offsets – the mean CO2 price, and
the maximum expected CO2 price. Even with the parties being considered as risk neutral,
it is not only the average price they should take into account when making a decision on
contracting REDD offsets.
We illustrated the impact of contracted REDD offsets on profit distribution of the
electricity producer in the numerical example based on realistic data. The modeling results
indicate that contracted REDD offsets might help avoid bankruptcy of CO2-intensive
producers at high levels of CO2 price and therefore serve as a stabilizing mechanism
during the transition of energy systems to greener technologies.
The idea behind the benefit sharing mechanism that we suggested to use, is to reduce
the risk of forest owners in selling the offsets for too low a price (as additional market
benefits might come later). This could reduce the offsets price in the first period, that
consequently reduces the risk of the electricity producer (regret if the CO2 price stays
low).
The modeling of a situation with asymmetric distributions of CO2 price provides pre-
liminary illustration of the positive role of a benefit sharing mechanism by increasing
contracted amounts of REDD offsets. This might be a promising direction for further
research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Firstly, by definition of maximum (8) we have:
Π(x∗
1
(p), p) = Πe(x
∗
1
(p))− E(x∗
1
(p))p ≥ Πe(x)− E(x)p. (38)
Secondly, let us assume on the contrary that for some x¯ ∈ X, such that E(x¯) 6=
E(x∗
1
(p)) the relation (38) is equality. Then, we have:
Πˆ(p) = Πe(x
∗
1
(p))− E(x∗
1
(p))p = Πe(x¯)− E(x¯)p. (39)
According to Remark 1 to Assumption 1 the equation (39) means that:
E(x∗
1
(p)) = E(x¯). (40)
Thus, we came to a contradiction, meaning that assumption (39) is false, and (11) is
true.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Firstly, by the condition of the lemma E(x∗
1
(p)) ≥ E , meaning that x∗
1
(p) ∈ X3
(23). Secondly, (21) is equivalent to (7) and, hence, solution to Problem 3 coincides with
the solution to Problem 1: x∗
3
= x∗
1
(p). To complete the proof we need to show that:
ΠˆR3 ≥ Πˆ
R
4 in (29).
Indeed, using (24), (28) and definition of maximum at price p (8), for x∗
4
∈ X4 ⊂ X
we come to the following chain of inequalities:
ΠˆR3 (p) = Πe(x
∗
3
)− p(E(x∗
3
)− E) = Πe(x
∗
1
(p))− pE(x∗
1
(p)) + pE ≥ (41)
Πe(x
∗
4
)− pE(x∗
4
) + pE = Πe(x
∗
4
)− p(E(x∗
4
)− E) ≥
Πe(x
∗
4
)− δp(E(x∗
4
)− E) = ΠˆR4 (p).
This relation means that ΠˆR3 (p) ≥ Πˆ
R
4 (p) if δ = 1, and Πˆ
R
3 (p) > Πˆ
R
4 (p) if δ ∈ [0, 1). Thus,
ΠˆR(p) = ΠˆR3 (p) = Πˆ(p) + pE . (42)
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Let us consider two cases depending on the optimal profit in (29).
Case 1. ΠˆR(p) = ΠˆR3 , meaning that the electricity producer does not share emission
offsets with the forest owner and emits E(x∗
3
) ≥ E . In this case the indifference equation
for the forest owner (16) reads as follows:
pFE = pE ⇒ pF = p. (43)
The indifference equation for the electricity producer (17) is the following:
ΠˆR(p)− pEE = Πˆ(p), (44)
and substitution of (9) and (24) to (44) gives the fair price:
pE = p+
Πe(x
∗
3
)− E(x∗
3
)p
E
−
Πe(x
∗
1
(p))− E(x∗
1
(p))p
E
(45)
For x∗
3
∈ X such that E(x∗
3
) = E > E(x∗
1
(p)) we can apply Lemma 1. Hence, (45)
leads to the required inequality:
Πe(x
∗
3
)− E(x∗
3
)p
E
−
Πe(x
∗
1
(p))− E(x∗
1
(p))p
E
< 0 ⇒ pE < p = pF , (46)
which proves Case 1.
Case 2. ΠˆR(p) = ΠˆR4 , meaning that the electricity producer can share emission offsets.
Let us find the optimal technological mix x∗
4
– solution to Problem 4. Problem (25)-(27)
is equivalent to the following problem (see (5), (7)):
max
x∈X4
Π(x, δp) = Πe(x)− δpE(x). (47)
Thus, two alternatives are possible in the Case 2.
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Case 2a. E ≥ E(x∗
1
(δp)), meaning that the contracted amount of offsets is larger than
optimal emissions at the CO2 price δp. In this case x
∗
1
(δp) ∈ X4 (27), and as it is the
solution to (47), we have:
x∗
4
(p) = x∗
1
(δp). (48)
Hence, according to Assumption 1 for all δ ∈ [0, 1) one has:
E(x∗
4
) = E(x∗
1
(δp)) > E(x∗
1
(p)). (49)
In this case the indifference condition (16) for the forest owner reads as follows:
p(1− δ)
(
E − E(x∗
4
)
)
+ pFE = pE , (50)
leading to the following fair price:
pF =
(1− δ)pE(x∗
4
)
E
+ δp. (51)
The indifference equation for the electricity producer takes the form:
Πe(x
∗
4
)− δp(E(x∗
4
)− E)− pEE = Πe(x
∗
1
(p))− E(x∗
1
(p))p. (52)
His fair price in this case is calculated as follows:
pE = δp+
Πe(x
∗
4
)− E(x∗
4
)δp
E
−
Πe(x
∗
1
(p))− E(x∗
1
(p))p
E
. (53)
For the optimal mix x∗
4
∈X such that (49) is true one can apply Lemma 1:
Πe(x
∗
1
(p))− E(x∗
1
(p))p > Πe(x
∗
4
)− E(x∗
4
)p. (54)
Substitution of (54) to (53) gives the required inequality:
pE = δp+
Πe(x
∗
4
)− E(x∗
4
)δp−
(
Πe(x
∗
1
(p))− E(x∗
1
(p))p
)
E
< (55)
δp+
Πe(x
∗
4
)− E(x∗
4
)δp−
(
Πe(x
∗
4
)− E(x∗
4
)p
)
E
=
δp+
(1− δ)pE(x∗
4
)
E
= pF .
Case 2b. E < E(x∗
1
(δp)), meaning that the contracted amount is less than optimal
emissions at price δp. In this case x∗
1
(δp) /∈ X4 (27). According to Assumption 1 there
exist price pˆ, δp < pˆ < p, and technological mix x∗
1
(pˆ) (see Figure 6), such that:
x∗
1
(pˆ) ∈X4 : E(x
∗
1
(pˆ)) = E . (56)
Below we show that technological mix x∗
4
= x∗
1
(pˆ) is the solution to Problem 4 in
this case. Let us take a technological mix x˜4 ∈ X4 (27) different from x
∗
1
(pˆ) (56). As
E(x˜4) ≤ E(x
∗
1
(pˆ)), the following inequality holds:
E(x∗
1
(pˆ))(pˆ− δp) ≥ E(x˜4)(pˆ− δp). (57)
At the same time, by definition of maximum (8) at the price pˆ we have:
Πe(x
∗
1
(pˆ))− E(x∗
1
(pˆ))pˆ ≥ Πe(x˜4)− E(x˜4)pˆ. (58)
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Figure 6: Optimal emissions of the electricity producer with respect to CO2 price (hori-
zontal axis) without REDD offsets. A conceptual graph of Eˆ(p), satisfying Assumption 1.
Combining (57) and (58) one gets:
Πe(x
∗
1
(pˆ))− E(x∗
1
(pˆ))pˆ+ E(x∗
1
(pˆ))(pˆ− δp) ≥ (59)
Πe(x˜4)− E(x˜4)pˆ+ E(x˜4)(pˆ− δp),
that leads to:
Πe(x
∗
1
(pˆ))− E(x∗
1
(pˆ))δp ≥ Πe(x˜4)− E(x˜4)δp for all x˜4 ∈X4, (60)
meaning that ΠˆR4 = Π(x
∗
1
(pˆ)), δp), and:
E(x∗
4
) = E(x∗
1
(pˆ)) = E > E(x∗
1
(p)). (61)
We have proved that in the Case 2b the electricity producer does not return any offsets
to the forest owner and uses the whole amount E . Thus, in this case ΠˆR(p) = ΠˆR3 = Πˆ
R
4
and this situation is the same as in Case 1. Thus, we proved that in all cases:
pE < pF . (62)
A.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. According to Assumption 1 the amount E˜ (33) is emitted by the electricity producer
at any price pl in the distribution (12). Hence, for every p = pl in the distribution the
conditions of Lemma 2 are true, meaning that the maximum profit with REDD ΠˆR(pl)
(31) differs from the maximum profit without REDD Πˆ(pl) (9) by the term plE˜ :
ΠˆR(pl) = Πˆ(pl) + plE˜ . (63)
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Substituting (63) to the definition of fair price of the electricity producer (19) we get:
pE =
EΠˆR − EΠˆ
E˜
=
EΠˆ + EplE˜ − EΠˆ
E˜
= Epl = p¯. (64)
At the same time, in this case no emissions are returned to the forest owner at any
CO2 price. Substituting E
R
l = 0 to (18) one gets:
pF = p¯. (65)
The same reasoning is valid for any E ∈ (0, E˜ ], and, hence, (32) is true.
For the amount of REDD offsets E ∈ (E˜ , E0] for some CO2 price realizations p = pl
in the distribution (12) the conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied and, hence, the fair prices
coincide. At the same time, there are price realizations in the distribution (12), for which
conditions of Lemma 3 are satisfied (at least for the price p˜ = max{pl}), meaning that
pF > pE . Therefore in this case pF > pE , which proves (34).
